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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-BAN ON PICK-
ETING IN FRONT OF INDIVIDUAL RESIDENCE DOES NOT VIOLATE
FIRST AMENDMENT. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
Between April 20 and May 20, 1985, Sandra Schultz and Robert
Braun, along with other pro-life demonstrators, picketed the home' of
Dr. Benjamin Victoria, in the town of Brookfield, Wisconsin.' The
demonstrators were protesting because Dr. Victoria performed abor-
tions at two clinics in neighboring towns.3 The picketers alleged that
the picketing was orderly and peaceful, but it generated substantial
controversy and several complaints.4
The Town Board adopted an ordinance stating, "[i]t is unlawful
for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or
dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield."5 The specified
1. The residence was picketed on at least six occasions for periods ranging from one to
one and a half hours. The number of picketers varied from 11 to more than 40. Frisby v.
Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2498 (1988).
2. Dr. Victoria was not a party to the action. The defendants-appellants were the Super-
visors of the Town Board, the Chairman of the Town Board, the Chief of Police, the Town
Attorney, and the Town of Brookfield. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339, 1342 (7th Cir. 1986).
3. The appellees stated that picketing on the street in front of Dr. Victoria's residence
would be more effective than picketing at the clinics where he performed abortions. It would
inform Dr. Victoria's neighbors about the issue. The picketing would generate greater media
coverage if it occurred in a residential area, enabling the group to reach more people with their
message. The picketers also did not want to interfere with the efforts of pro-life sidewalk
counselors at the abortion clinics. Id. at 1341-42.
4. 108 S. Ct. at 2498. The parties disagreed as to the conduct of the picketers. The town
presented sworn affidavits indicating that the picketers tied red ribbons on the bushes and door
of the house, shouted slogans that included references to Dr. Victoria as a "baby killer," and
on occasion temporarily blocked family members from entering or exiting the home. 807 F.2d
at 1340-41.
Other affidavits stated that the picketers were observed telling at least two small children
in the neighborhood that Dr. Victoria was killing babies. However, the picketers submitted
sworn affidavits that their picketing was peaceful, polite, and restrained. Id. at 1341.
The district court found that "[t]he picketing seems to have been conducted for the most
part in a peaceable and orderly fashion." Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D. Wis.
1985).
5. 619 F. Supp. at 794 (quoting TOWN OF BROOKFIELD, Wis., GEN. CODE § 9.17(2)
(1985)). The town initially passed an ordinance prohibiting all residential picketing except for
picketing during a labor dispute. The Town Attorney, however, advised the Town Supervisors
that the labor picketing exception probably rendered the ordinance unconstitutional in view of
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purpose of the ordinance was to protect the privacy of the Town's
residents and to promote public safety.6 Faced with the threat of
prosecution under the new ordinance, the group ceased picketing at
the Victoria residence.
The picketers filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin.' The complaint alleged that the ordinance vio-
lated the picketers' rights under the first amendment of the United
States Constitution.' The district court ruled that the picketers were
likely to succeed on the merits and issued a preliminary injunction
against enforcing the ordinance. The court concluded that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional because its absolute ban on speech in a
public forum was not narrowly tailored to advance the Town's stated
interests.9
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed."° The court found that residential streets are public forums
naturally suitable for disseminating ideas.1' The court held that the
ordinance failed to provide adequate alternative channels of expres-
sion for the picketers,12 and the Town had less restrictive means avail-
able to address its legitimate interests in protecting the privacy of its
residents. 13
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (similar ordinance violated the equal protection clause).
The first ordinance was repealed and replaced with a flat ban on all residential picketing. 108
S. Ct. at 2498.
6. 108 S. Ct. at 2498. The Court noted that the primary stated purpose of the ordinance
was "the protection and preservation of the home" and that "members of the community
enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy." Id. The
Town Board determined that "the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwell-
ings causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants ... [and] has as its object the
harassing of such occupants." Id. The ordinance also states a concern for public safety, not-
ing that picketing obstructs and interferes with "the free use of public sidewalks and public
ways of travel." Id.
7. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wis. 1985). The group sought declaratory
and injunctive relief from enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 793.
8. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 619 F. Supp. at 796-97.
10. Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986). See Note, Balancing First Amend-
ment Rights to Freedom of Expression Against the Rights of an Individual to Privacy in the
Home, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 201 (1987).
11. 807 F.2d at 1345-47.
12. Id. at 1347-48.
13. Id. at 1350-54.
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versed.' 4 The Court construed the Brookfield ordinance to prohibit
only focused picketing in front of a single residence, but not all picket-
ing in residential neighborhoods. 5 The ordinance thus left open am-
ple alternative channels of communication 16 and served a significant
government interest in protecting residential privacy.' 7 The Court
concluded that single residence picketing inherently intrudes on resi-
dential privacy. Therefore, a complete ban was the most narrowly
tailored means of protecting such privacy interests. 8 The ordinance
so construed did not violate the first amendment. Frisby v. Schultz,
108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
The first amendment prohibits the government from enacting
laws "abridging the freedom of speech" or "the right of the people
peaceably to assemble."' 9 The values embraced in the first amend-
ment reflect a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."2 The Supreme Court has characterized freedom of speech as
a fundamental personal right 2I and "the essence of self-
government." 22
The right of free speech is not absolute. 23 For instance, the Con-
stitution does not protect someone who falsely shouts "Fire!" in a
crowded theater.24  The government may completely forbid certain
precise categories of speech without violating the first amendment.
It may also place reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on
14. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
15. Id. at 2501.
16. Id. at 2501-02.
17. Id. at 2502.
18. Id. at 2502-04.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment was extended to the states through the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The
first amendment also applies to city ordinances. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). For a summary of the
values that justify free speech, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 835-37 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK].
21. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
22. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
23. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). See also Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) ("protected speech is not
equally permissible in all places and at all times"); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) ("the First Amendment does not guarantee the right
to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired").
24. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
25. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (misleading commercial
speech); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech that incites imminent lawless action); New York Times v. Sulli-
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constitutionally protected speech.26
"Speech" can involve more than just the spoken word. Certain
expressive activities have historically been associated with speech and
assembly.27 The Supreme Court has recognized these expressive ac-
tivities and has extended first amendment protection to a wider range
of expression2" than mere verbal communication.29 Picketing"° is one
such activity. 31 Since 1940 the Court has generally considered peace-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(fighting words).
26. See NOWAK, supra note 20, at 970-84. See also Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little Peo-
ple, and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expres-
sion, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 757 (1986).
27. Certain forms of conduct are naturally expressive. Regulation of these activities im-
plicates the first amendment.
The framers of the First Amendment clearly intended to extend its protection beyond
sheer verbal communication. They included in the guarantee not only freedom of
speech and the press but in addition the right of assembly and petition. Plainly they
meant to embrace more than the individual speaker or the written word, and to
establish the kind of spirited and even turbulent system that included meetings,
marches, demonstrations, and similar aspects of assembly.
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 293 (1970).
28. Professor Emerson contends that an effective right of assembly and petition demands
that expressive conduct extending beyond mere speech be protected. He distinguishes between
"expression" and "action," arguing for full first amendment protection for the former. How-
ever, he notes that the Supreme Court, in its more recent decisions, has adopted a two-level
theory that distinguishes between "pure speech" and "speech plus" with the latter receiving a
lesser degree of protection under the first amendment. Id. at 293-94.
While this two-level theory had its origin in early labor picketing cases, see infra note 31,
it was forcefully restated by Justice Goldberg in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965):
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate
ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and high-
ways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.
Id. at 555. For criticism of this distinction between pure speech and speech plus, see T. EMER-
SON, supra note 27, at 297-98 and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-7, at
825-32 (2d ed. 1988).
29. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (consumer boycott);
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (solicitation); Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace symbol affixed to flag); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing sign on back of jacket); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (wearing black armbands); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (peaceful sit-in
on premises of public library); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (civil rights
demonstration); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compul-
sory flag salute); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door distribution of
religious handbills); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of leaflets);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (displaying red flag).
30. "Picketing" can encompass a wide range of activities, but is generally characterized by
one or more persons walking or standing in a given place while displaying a sign. See Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 n.18 (1940).
31. Picketing was characterized as "speech plus" in Amalgamated Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 326 (1968) (Douglas J., concurring). The concept
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ful picketing as constitutionally protected speech.3 2 This is especially
true of "public-issue" picketing,33 which is "an exercise of ... basic
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form,"34 and
may be traced to Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Bakery and Pastry Drivers' Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942):
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a
particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of
one kind or another, quite irregpective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive
regulation.
Id. at 776-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
32. It is well settled that the first amendment does not protect picketing that is accompa-
nied by violence, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); picketing that seeks
to coerce an illegal objective, International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957); or picketers who trespass on private property, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976).
Nevertheless, "[t]here is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leaflet-
ting are expressive activities involving 'speech' protected by the First Amendment." United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983).
Since picketing is a combination of speech and conduct, it does not rise to the level of first
amendment protection afforded to "pure speech." The precise degree of protection will de-
pend on the circumstances surrounding the picketing activity. See J. WHITEHEAD, THE
RIGHT TO PICKET AND THE FREEDOM OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 73-75 (1984).
33. The Fifth Circuit distinguished "public issue" pickets from private pickets in Davis v.
Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (1968): "[p]rivate pickets are usually concerned with labor disputes
.... The decisions suggest that private pickets are exercises of economic power and create
many issues not caused by the 'public issue' demonstration." Id. at 735 n.6. See also DeGreg-
ory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977) (labor picketing less protected than public
issue picketing).
The distinction between "public issue" picketing and labor picketing was first articulated
by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). The Court in Frisby stated that
"we have traditionally subjected restrictions on public issue picketing to careful scrutiny." 108
S. Ct. at 2499. See also Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1162 (1988) (the "central importance of
protecting speech on public issues" has led the Court to "scrutinize carefully any restrictions
on public issue picketing").
Professor Emerson argues that there is a fundamental difference between labor picketing
and non-labor picketing. Labor picketing normally involves the use of economic pressure by
"closely knit, powerful organizations." "A labor picket line is thus not so much a rational
appeal to persuasion as a signal for the application of immediate and enormous economic
leverage .... As such it must, under ordinary circumstances, be classified as action, rather
than expression." T. EMERSON, supra note 27, at 445. On the other hand, racial, consumer,
and other non-labor picketing should receive full first amendment protection. Id. at 448.
The Supreme Court has long been concerned with the "coercive" economic effect of labor
picketing. The Court's current analysis permits labor picketing to be regulated more freely.
See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (union violated NLRA
by peacefully picketing on public sidewalk in front of consumer entrances to "neutral" busi-
nesses that sold insurance policies of employer engaged in labor dispute). For an argument
that certain labor picketing should likewise be subject to strict first amendment scrutiny, see
Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free
Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982).
34. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 466-67 (1980) (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
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has "always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values."
35
Picketing has not always been lawful. 36 Prior to 190031 courts
were generally hostile to it, outlawing even peaceful picketing.38 The
Supreme Court first suggested that picketing was an exercise of free
speech in 1937. 39 Three years later the Court specifically extended
first amendment protection to peaceful labor picketing in Thornhill v.
Alabama.4° But subsequent cases curtailed the pronouncements made
in Thornhill.
41
35. Id. at 466-67. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982).
The Court in Carey explained why speech on issues of public concern is so vitally important:
The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that gov-
ernment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be ob-
tained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.
447 U.S. at 467 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
36. For a historical perspective on picketing, see J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 32, at 69-119.
37. Picketing was generally considered a tort in the nineteenth century. See Tanenhaus,
Picketing as a Tort: The Development of the Law of Picketing from 1880 to 1940, 14 U. PITr.
L. REV. 170 (1953). Largely due to the influence of then Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in
his article, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894), and in his dissent in
Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (patrolling does not necessarily carry with it a threat of bodily harm), some courts began
to accept the economic interests of labor unions as justification for peaceful picketing. See J.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 32, at 70-71 and F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 24-31 (1930).
38. This hostility has not completely disappeared. In 1905 a federal court found "[tihere
is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity,
or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 F. 582,
584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa E.D. 1905).
As recently as 1962, a New York court criticized the actions of demonstrators who pick-
eted the home of the board chairman of a private hospital (who was also a judge) during a
labor dispute:
Truly it is shocking, reprehensible and outrageous, deserving the unhesitating and
scathing rebuke of the court. Conducted at a considerable distance from the hospi-
tal, in an exclusively residential area, it was apparently aimed to cause unspeakable
embarrassment, humiliation, and mortification to the named jurist and his family. It
represents a form of direct and unmitigated coercion and terrorism that should be
roundly denounced and sternly condemned. Not within any conceivable limit of the
right to free speech and the right to inform, it represents a mean, foul, and sinister
blow, one to which decent unionism would not stoop.
Hebrew Home v. Davis, 38 Misc. 2d 173, 178, 235 N.Y.S.2d 318, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
39. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937). Senn upheld a Wisconsin
statute which authorized peaceful labor picketing. Union members could picket the business
of a brick layer so long as the protest was peaceful and without intimidation or coercion. In
this case, the brick layer's office was also his home.
40. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
41. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (Wis-
consin's state policy against union coercion was superior to the union's right to picket). The
Court observed that subsequent decisions limited the "broad pronouncements, but not the
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The civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s and 70s gave rise to
a further expansion of picketing freedoms. Protestors involved in
peaceful marching and picketing received first amendment protection
in Edwards v. South Carolina42 and Cox v. Louisiana.43 The Court in
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley' struck down a city ordinance that
prohibited all picketing near a school, except peaceful picketing dur-
ing a labor dispute. The ordinance was unconstitutional because it
made an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other
peaceful forms of picketing.45
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have continued this trend
specific holding, of Thornhill," since picketing involved more than just communication and
thus could not be immune from state regulation. Id. at 289. The state could constitutionally
enjoin peaceful picketing, even during a labor dispute, when such picketing conflicted with a
"valid state policy in a domain open to state regulation." Id. at 291.
Thornhill had little effect upon state courts, where most picketing cases were heard. In-
junctions against picketing continued to be issued by many state courts which either distin-
guished or ignored Thornhill. One commentator noted:
We have travelled a long way. For a time it seemed as though peaceful picketing
were [sic] going to receive real constitutional protection. Now it looks as though
state courts, by the simple device of declaring union objectives contrary to public
policy, can ban peaceful picketing in almost all situations where there is room for
difference of opinion as to these objectives. We seem to be on the road back to gov-
ernment by injunction.
Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally Protected?, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1950).
42. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Nearly 200 demonstrators carrying picket signs were convicted
for breach of the peace after they marched without incident through the grounds of the state
capitol to protest state segregation policies. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction on
first amendment grounds, asserting that "[t]he circumstances in this case reflect an exercise of
these basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form." Id. at 235.
43. 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (Cox I) and 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II). During a peaceful civil
rights demonstration, Cox was arrested for breach of the peace, obstructing a public passage-
way, and picketing near a courthouse. The Court recognized picketing and parading as per-
missible first amendment activities, but also recognized a legitimate state interest in regulating
picketing to maintain public order. 379 U.S. at 554-55. Justice Goldberg, writing for the
Court, upheld the Louisiana statute that prohibited picketing "in or near" a courthouse to
prevent disruption of judicial proceedings. He argued that picketing does not rise to the level
of protection afforded "pure speech." Id. See supra note 28.
Justice Black went even further. He took the position that marching or picketing was
conduct, unprotected by the first amendment, which could be regulated or prohibited. How-
ever, the exception in the anti-picketing statute for labor picketing was
censorship in a most odious form .... [T]o deny this appellant and his group use of
the streets because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing other
groups to use the streets to voice opinions on other subjects ... amounts ... to an
invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
379 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., concurring).
44. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Mosley would walk the public sidewalk adjoining the school,
carrying a sign protesting "black discrimination." Id. at 93.
45. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to re-
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of granting broad first amendment protection to "public-issue" pick-
eting. An absolute ban on picketing on the public sidewalks sur-
rounding the Supreme Court building was held unconstitutional in
United States v. Grace.46 In Boos v. Barry4" the Court struck down a
law forbidding the display of picket signs critical of foreign govern-
ments on public sidewalks near their embassies.
Residential picketing48 poses a greater difficulty for the courts
because of the convergence of three fundamental interests-free
speech, public order, and privacy.4 9 State courts have frequently
found peaceful picketing of a private home to be an invasion of the
homeowner's privacy 50 or a danger to public order.5"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wauwatosa v. King 2 upheld a
state statute that made it unlawful for anyone to engage in picketing
before or about a private residence. 53 The court found that safeguard-
ing the home was a vital public interest and the statutory presumption
that residential picketing disturbs family privacy was reasonable. 54
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95
(citations omitted).
To the extent that the difference between public-issue picketing and labor picketing is
content-related, the distinction cannot be relied upon to determine who can and cannot picket.
However, to the extent the difference is based on the action component inherent in certain
types of labor picketing (i.e., its economic "coercion"), the distinction is valid. See supra note
33.
46. 461 U.S. 171 (1983). One person was threatened with arrest for displaying on the
sidewalk a picket sign containing the text of the first amendment.
47. 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988) (the Court held the ordinance to be a content-based restriction
on political speech in a public forum).
48. See generally Arnolds & Seng, Picketing and Privacy: Can I Patrol on the Street
Where You Live?, S. ILL. U.L.J. 463 (1982); Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First
Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177 (1967); Annotation, Peaceful Picketing of Private Resi-
dence, 42 A.L.R.3d 1353 (1972); Comment, Picketers at the Doorstep, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 95 (1974).
49. For a discussion of the balancing of these interests, see Arnolds & Seng, supra note 48,
at 470-84; Comment, supra note 48, at 105-22.
50. E.g., State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W. 302 (1936) (strikers' display of banners
in front of foreman's home was attempt to inject industrial controversy into domestic life);
State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930) (banner displayed by labor pickets in
front of nonstriking employee's home disregarded her right to be undisturbed).
51. E.g., State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939) (employee not allowed to
picket employer's residence where his conduct was likely to arouse anger, disturbance, or vio-
lence); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 94 Misc. 2d 121, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (chanting
crowd of 40 gay rights advocates carried baseball bats, whistles, and bullhorns); People v.
Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Magis. Ct. 1941) (sheer number of picketers constituted threat to
public peace).
52. 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).
53. The ordinance was virtually identical to the one struck down in Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455 (1980). See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
54. The court noted the alleged psychological harm caused by residential picketing:
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Since the state can place a constitutionally valid limitation on where
speech occurs, picketing can be legitimately prohibited in residential
areas.
While judicial opposition to residential picketing persists, many
state courts in recent years have shown increasing sympathy for the
free speech rights of the picketers. In certain circumstances, the
courts have permitted picketing the homes of landlords by tenants"
or concerned citizens.5 6 Similarly, courts have upheld the right to
picket the private residence of a public official.5 7 In State v. Schuller"
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a statutory ban on all resi-
dential picketing violated the right to free speech because less restric-
tive alternatives were available to protect residential privacy. 9
Federal courts have generally balanced the competing interests in
favor of the picketers' first amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit
struck down a municipal ordinance making it unlawful for more than
two people to picket in front of a residence, a place of business, or a
To those inside and to the neighbors, the home becomes something less than a home
when and while the picketing, demonstrating and parading continue .... The news-
worthiness of the situation stems in part from the tensions created and pressures
focused on the home. Such tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physi-
cal, but they are not, for that reason, less inimical to family privacy and truly domes-
tic tranquility.
49 Wis. 2d at 411-12, 182 N.W.2d at 537.
55. Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622
(1969). Since the landlord was otherwise inaccessible, the court found no reasonable alterna-
tive forum. The court noted that this was not a "true case" of residential picketing, and there-
fore refused to issue "a blanket rule permitting residential picketing." Id. at 580-81, 252 A.2d
at 624.
56. People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972).
The First Circuit relied on Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), to strike
down as violative of the equal protection clause a municipal ordinance that prohibited residen-
tial picketing except where the residence was the site of a labor dispute. The court did not
reach the first amendment questions.
57. Flores v. City & County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950) (state gover-
nor); State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 372, 274 A.2d 897 (1970) (state agency head).
58. 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977) (peaceful picketing on public sidewalk in front of
home of Secretary of Defense).
59. The court said that
Rather than prohibiting certain specific conduct associated with picketing and within
the purview of the state's power to control, the Maryland Act provides for a blanket
ban on residential picketing itself. The statute proscribes picketing even if it is peace-
ful and orderly, is quiet and non-threatening, is on public property, and does not
obstruct persons or traffic. The ban applies regardless of the time of day the picket-
ing takes place. While picketing and parading and the use of the streets for such
purpose is subject to reasonable time, manner and place regulation, such activity may
not be wholly denied ....
Id. at 315-16, 372 A.2d at 1081 (citation omitted).
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public building.' The ordinance's absolute ban did not "aim specifi-
cally at a serious encroachment on a state interest or evince any at-
tempt to balance the individual's right to effective communication and
the state's interest in peace and harmony.1 61 Other circuits have.simi-
larly found absolute bans on residential picketing as overly broad re-
strictions on protected speech and therefore unconstitutional. 62  The
single exception is the Tenth Circuit, 63 which upheld a municipal or-
dinance' forbidding residential picketing as a "valid exercise of gov-
ernmental power" to insure community privacy and order. 65
The residential picketing issue first reached the Supreme Court in
Gregory v. City of Chicago.66 The Court overturned disorderly con-
duct convictions of civil rights protestors who picketed the home of
the mayor. While recognizing that the first amendment protected the
actions of the picketers, the Court concluded that the picketers' con-
victions under the disorderly conduct statute violated due process.
Thus the holding in Gregory did not actually resolve the question of
residential picketing.67
60. Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968).
61. Id. at 735.
62. Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1987); Schultz v. Frisby, 807
F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
63. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974). The dispute arose over alleged racial
discrimination in employment practices. The protestors picketed the residences of city offi-
cials. The mayor testified that on one occasion some 300 picketers appeared outside his home
with signs and noisy chants, upsetting himself, his wife and his neighbors. Id. at 541-42. The
Seventh Circuit in Schultz stated, "[w]e think Francois more accurately represents the direc-
tion of first amendment law than does the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Garcia." 807 F.2d
at 1354.
64. This ordinance was very similar to the one in Frisby. It did not provide for a labor-
picketing exception.
65. 507 F.2d at 545. The court distinguished picketing in a "public place" from picketing
"before or about residences," and applied the nuisance doctrine to justify the prohibition. Id.
at 544. See also DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977) (state has substantial
interest in preserving residential privacy and limiting scope of labor picketing to site of
dispute).
66. 394 U.S. Ill (1969).
67. "This is a simple case," wrote Chief Justice Warren for the Court. 394 U.S. at 111.
Justice Black concurred in the judgment of the Court, but could not agree that the case was
simple. He noted that picketing, like other conduct, could be regulated by the government in
the interest of protecting the privacy of the home:
Speech and press are, of course, to be free, so that public matters can be discussed
with impunity. But picketing and demonstrating can be regulated like other conduct
of men. I believe that the homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the
weary, and the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, marching, tramp-
ing, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the minds of men, wo-
men, and children with fears of the unknown.
Id. at 125 (Black, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court was again presented with the question of
whether an absolute ban on residential picketing was constitutional in
Carey v. Brown.6" Civil rights demonstrators challenged an Illinois
statute that prohibited residential picketing except where the resi-
dence was also a "place of employment involved in a labor dispute. '69
The Court sidestepped the residential picketing question and consid-
ered only the equal protection issue, holding that the statute discrimi-
nated against non-labor picketing. 70 The statute's exception for labor
picketing largely undermined the preservation of residential privacy
justification advanced for the statute since labor picketing was equally
likely to intrude on the tranquility of the home.7 ' The Court did not
decide whether a ban on all residential picketing, regardless of its con-
tent, would violate the first amendment.72
68. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
69. The Illinois statute provided:
It is unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any person,
except when the residence or dwelling is used as a place of business. However, this
Article does not apply to a person peacefully picketing his own residence or dwelling
and does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a
labor dispute or the place of holding a meeting or assembly on premises commonly
used to discuss subjects of general public interest.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 21.1-2 (1979). Subsequent to Carey, the statute was amended to
delete the labor exception.
70. The Court found that the anti-picketing statute in this case was constitutionally indis-
tinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley. 447 U.S. at 460. Justice Rehnquist, in
his dissent, argued that the Court had mischaracterized the statute. The language of the stat-
ute, he said, exempted four categories of residences from the ban on picketing. If the residence
is used as a place of business or is a place where discussions of general public issues are held,
then all peaceful picketing is allowed. If a residence is also used as a place of employment
which is involved in a labor dispute, labor-related picketing is allowed. Finally, a resident is
allowed to picket his own home. Thus, Justice Rehnquist argued, "the principal determinant
of a person's right to picket a residence in Illinois is not content, as the Court suggests, but
rather the character of the residence sought to be picketed." Id. at 473-74 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist rejected the Court's argument that the prohibition was based on
content alone.
71. The Court acknowledged the purpose of the statute in preserving privacy in the home,
but noted:
For even the most legitimate goal may not be advanced in a constitutionally imper-
missible manner. And though we might agree that certain state interests may be so
compelling that where no adequate alternatives exist a content-based distinction-if
narrowly drawn-would be a permissible way of furthering those objectives, this is
not such a case.
Id. at 464-65 (citation omitted).
72. The Court observed:
Because the Court of Appeals concluded that the labor dispute exception was not
severable from the remainder of the statute, it invalidated the enactment in its en-
tirety. The court therefore found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality
under the First Amendment of a statute that prohibited all residential picketing. Be-
cause we find the present statute defective on equal protection principles, we likewise
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Residential anti-picketing laws restrict speech and are thus sub-
ject to first amendment scrutiny. The extent to which the government
may limit expressive activity on public property depends upon the
particular location, or "forum," in which the activity takes place.
The Supreme Court identified three types of forums in Perry Educa-
tional Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association:7 the tradi-
tional public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic
forum.
The first amendment affords the greatest protection to expression
in public forums. "In places which by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the
State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed." 74 The
traditional public forum consists of public property historically used
for public speech and assembly. A designated public forum, such as
an auditorium, is public property which the state has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity.75 Once the govern-
ment opens such a place for public expression, it is bound by the same
standards for regulating speech that apply in a traditional public
forum.7 6
In contrast, the government may impose greater restrictions on
speech in a nonpublic forum. Nonpublic forums, such as mailboxes,
consist of public properties which are neither by tradition nor
designation forums for public communication.77
do not consider whether a statute barring all residential picketing regardless of its
subject matter would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 459 n.2 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
However, Justice Rehnquist in his dissent suggested that the majority had indeed decided
the question. "The Court today suggests that some picketing activities would have but a 'neg-
ligible impact on privacy interests,' intimating that Illinois could satisfy its interests through
more limited restrictions on picketing, such as regulating the hours and numbers of pickets."
Id. at 478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the state could permissi-
bly conclude that "even one individual camped in front of the home is unacceptable." Id. See
also Arnolds & Seng, supra note 48, at 465-66.
73. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). For criticism of the public forum analysis, see Farber & Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Lee, supra note 26, at 771-73.
74. 460 U.S. at 45.
75. Id. E.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university facilities opened to
student groups); City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board meetings opened to citizens); Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theater opened for public activities).
76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
77. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (charity
drive for federal employees); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (city street light posts); Perry, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (school mail
facilities).
[Vol. 11:691
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Streets have historically been considered traditional public fo-
rums. This includes streets that run through residential areas. Courts
have relied upon Justice Owen Roberts' influential concurring opinion
in Hague v. CIO, 78 which stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.79
The government may not forbid all communicative activity in
public forums.8" Content-based exclusions on speech in a public fo-
rum are permitted when there is a compelling state interest. 81 The
state may also impose regulations of time, place, and manner 82 that
are content-neutral,8 3 are narrowly tailored84 to serve a significant
78. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 515 (Roberts, J., concurring). See also Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1162
(1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177-80 (1983); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
515 (1976); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
80. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Ii, Grace the Court noted that the ordinance prohibiting the
display of signs on the grounds of the Supreme Court building did not ban all expressive
conduct. 461 U.S. at 181 n.10. Similarly, the Town of Brookfield's ordinance does not pro-
hibit all communication on residential streets. 108 S. Ct. at 2501-02.
81. Perry, 460 U.S at 45. A constitutional restriction of speech based on content must
either fall within one of the narrow exceptions to protected speech, see supra notes 24-25 and
accompanying text, or the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry, 460 U.S at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461 (1980)); see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
82. Perry, 460 U.S at 45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The test for analyz-
ing time, place, and manner restrictions was first expressed by the Court in United States v.
O'Brien:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms .... [W]e
think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interest.
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
83. Perry, 460 U.S at 45.
84. Id. Justice Brennan, in NAACP v. Button, said that "[p]recision of regulation must
be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms." 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963).
Federal courts have disagreed on what exactly qualifies as being narrowly tailored. The
Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits hold that the proponent of the regulation must show that
the government's interests are advanced by the least restrictive means available. See City of
Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1551-54 (7th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 107 S.
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governmental interest,85 and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.86
Frequently, the most significant question is whether the govern-
ment has precisely drafted the residential anti-picketing statute so as
Ct. 919 (1987); ACORN v. City of Frontenac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983); New York
City Unemployed & Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1982). The
Third Circuit adopted a less stringent standard, requiring the proponent to show only that
ample alternative channels for communication exist. See Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs and
Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 1984) (ordinance banning door-to-
door solicitation "precisely drawn" but "least restrictive means" test rejected under rationale
that activity occurred in non-public forum).
Professor Lee contends that the less restrictive means analysis involves a highly subjective
form of balancing "that the Court can manipulate to achieve any result it prefers" and repeats
Justice Blackmun's observation that a judge would be "unimaginative" if he could not come
up with some regulation a little less drastic. Lee, supra note 26, at 793 (citing Illinois State Bd.
of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun J.,
concurring)).
85. Perry, 460 U.S at 45. The interest most frequently served in residential anti-picketing
statutes is the protection of the privacy and tranquility of the home. Simply stated, residential
picketing restrictions protect one's right "to be let alone" in his home. See Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970); Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy that limits govern-
mental interference in certain areas of a citizen's life. The first amendment safeguards privacy
in belief and expression. The third and fourth amendments protect privacy of person and
home from peacetime quartering of soldiers and unreasonable searches and seizures. The fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination also reflects a concern for privacy. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court found an independent right to privacy
emanating from these amendments plus the ninth and fourteenth. See, e.g., NOWAK, supra
note 20, at 684-85; T. EMERSON, supra note 27, at 544-48. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (right to abortion based on right to privacy); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (right
to privacy protects non-disclosure of personal matters and independent decision making).
This constitutional right to privacy, which may be more accurately described as a right to
personal autonomy, is distinct from the government interest in protecting residential privacy.
The constitutional right to privacy protects the individual from governmental interference in
personal choices. Since residential picketing is the result of action by private individuals rather
than the government, the constitutional right to privacy is not implicated. Still, the preserva-
tion of peace and quiet in the home is an important interest, and the state may guard against its
infringement. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (prohibition of sound trucks in resi-
dential neighborhoods).
For a discussion of privacy and residential picketing, see T. EMERSON, supra note 27, at
544-48; Arnolds & Seng, supra note 48, at 474-79; Comment, supra note 48, at 107-22.
86. Perry, 460 U.S at 45. See Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) ("a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the
remaining modes of communication are inadequate"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (restriction is impermissible if it entirely prevents a
speaker from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully com-
municate); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("one is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place").
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not to restrict more speech than necessary. 7 The Supreme Court has
applied various tests to determine if a restriction is narrowly tailored.
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence 8 the Court held
that regulations related to the end they are designed to serve are not
invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might
be less burdensome on speech.8 9 Recent decisions, however, may in-
dicate the Court's willingness to adopt the least restrictive means
test.90
The public forum analysis affected the outcome of a recent Ar-
kansas case, Pursley v. City of Fayetteville.91 Although decided prior
to Frisby,92 Pursley presented the Eighth Circuit with facts almost
identical to those in Frisby. In Pursley the Eighth Circuit struck
down as unconstitutionally overbroad a municipal ordinance prohib-
iting the picketing of private residences.93 Utilizing a three-part
test,94 the court first decided that picketing involves expressive activ-
ity protected by the first amendment.95 It then determined, contrary
to the finding of the trial court, that the sidewalk in front of the doc-
87. Under the Perry test, residential anti-picketing statutes are typically struck down be-
cause they are not narrowly tailored. Pursley v. City of Fayetteville, 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir.
1987); Schultz v. Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988); Schultz
v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Wisc. 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108
S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
88. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
89. Id. at 297-99. See also, Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984) (White, J.,
concurring) ("[t]he less-restrictive alternative analysis.., has never been a part of the inquiry
into the validity of a time, place and manner regulation").
90. See supra note 84. Over a vigorous dissent by Justice White, the Court affirmed with-
out opinion a decision which applied the requirement that the ordinance be the least restrictive
means available. City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 107 S. Ct. 919 (1987). See
also Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1168 (1988) (invalidating ordinance because "a less restric-
tive alternative is readily available") (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280
n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
91. 820 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1987). Pro-life demonstrators picketed the home of a local
physician who performed abortions. In response the city council passed an ordinance prohibit-
ing residential picketing. See Note, Pursley v. City of Fayetteville: Flat Bans on Residential
Picketing Held Unconstitutional, 41 ARK. L. REV. 861 (1988).
92. 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
93. The ordinance stated: "It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to engage in
demonstrations of any type or to picket before or about the residence or dwelling place of any
individual." 820 F.2d at 952 n.3 (quoting Fayetteville, Ark., Ordinance No. 3125).
94. Id. at 954. The Eighth Circuit adopted the test used by the Supreme Court in Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). The Court first
determined whether the activity was speech protected by the first amendment, then identified
the nature of the forum, and finally decided whether the justifications for restricting the ex-
pressive activity satisfied the relevant constitutional standard. Id. at 797.
95. 820 F.2d at 954. The court noted that "picketing is not pure speech." Id.
1988-89]
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tor's residence was a "public forum." 96 Finally, applying the stan-
dard set forth in Perry,97 the court found that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored9" despite the fact that it was content-neutral99 and
protected peace and privacy in the home.'"
Frisby v. Schultz. ° . again presented the United States Supreme
Court with the issue of whether a complete ban on picketing "before
or about" any residence is consistent with the first amendment's free
speech guarantee. The Court first observed that restrictions on "pub-
lic issue" picketing"°2 are traditionally subject to "careful scru-
tiny."' 3 The nature of the "place," or forum, the speaker seeks to
utilize determines what limits may be placed on protected speech." °
The appellants argued that the streets of Brookfield are a non-
public forum"°5 for first amendment purposes. 0 6 The Court rejected
this argument, stating "[o]ur prior holdings make clear that a public
street does not lose its status as a traditional public forum simply be-
cause it runs through a residential neighborhood.' 0 7 Hence, the or-
96. Id. at 954-55. The Pursley court relied on the Seventh Circuit's finding in Schultz v.
Frisby, 807 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988), that residential streets
were public forums. The district court's finding to the contrary was considered a "drastic shift
in 'public forum' doctrine." 820 F.2d at 955 n.5.
97. 820 F.2d at 955. Accord United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
98. 820 F.2d at 956. The court of appeals stated:
The way the ordinance carries out this goal [citizens' peace at home], however is to
completely ban picketing anywhere a home is located, be it a house surrounded by
other houses, a townhouse surrounded by shops, or an apartment sharing space in a
building with offices. A "residence or dwelling place" is often located close to the
hubbub of daily commerce. A person living in such a home cannot expect the same
level of external tranquility as can a person living in a purely residential neighbor-
hood. Thus, to prohibit picketing in such a busy commercial area is, in effect, to
discriminate against speech .. . . If the ordinance in this case were applied to a
dwelling located in a mixed commercial and residential area, the ban would have a
negligible effect on the serenity of the neighborhood while impinging significantly on
the First Amendment. Legitimate picketing of an office or store could be quashed
because of the presence of an adjacent apartment.
Id. at 956-57.
99. Id. at 955.
100. Id.
101. 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court.
102. 108 S. Ct. at 2499. See supra note 33.
103. 108 S. Ct. at 2499.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2499-2500. The appellants contended that the Brookfield streets were narrow
and residential, thus not by tradition or designation held open for public communication. Id.
The streets of Brookfield were about thirty feet wide, with no sidewalks or streetlights, and ran
through exclusively residential areas. 619 F. Supp. at 793-94. Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
called this a "rogue argument." 108 S. Ct. at 2506 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
107. 108 S. Ct. at 2500. The Court referred to public streets as the "archetype" of a tradi-
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dinance must satisfy the stringent standards established for regulating
speech in the traditional public forum.10 8 Those standards, the Court
observed, specify that such regulations must be content-neutral, nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. 0 9
The appellees contended that although the Brookfield ordinance
was content-neutral on its face, I I a similar Wisconsin law that con-
tained an express exception for peaceful labor picketing"' was con-
trolling. The Court deferred to the lower courts' finding that the
ordinance contained no implied exception for labor picketing and was
content-neutral. " 12
The Court narrowly construed the ordinance to prohibit only
picketing in front of a single residence, but not general marching
through residential neighborhoods or even walking a route in front of
an entire block of houses.' ' The Court concluded that "the use of
the singular form of the words 'residence' and 'dwelling' suggests that
the ordinance is intended to prohibit only picketing focused on, and
taking place in front of, a particular residence.""' 4 Rejecting the
broad interpretation given the ordinance by the lower courts," 5 the
tional public forum. Id. at 2499. The Court relied on Carey to foreclose the appellants' argu-
ment, interpreting it to expressly recognize residential streets and sidewalks as public forums.
Id. at 2500.
This affirmed the Seventh Circuit's finding that the streets of Brookfield were public fo-
rums. That court stated that "[a] holding that streets located in residential areas are not public
forums would represent a radical departure from the general direction of first amendment
jurisprudence. Such a holding would effectively place vast areas of this country out of the
reach of the protection of the first amendment." 807 F.2d 1339, 1347 (7th Cir. 1986).
108. 108 S. Ct. at 2500.
109. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
110. The Brookfield ordinance did not contain an exception for labor or other types of
picketing. See supra text accompanying note 5.
111. 108 S. Ct. at 2500. See Wis. STAT. § 103.53(1) (1985-1986). Other states have similar
statutes, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-225 (1987). Such statutes are generally unconstitu-
tional since they make an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and non-labor
picketing. Carey, 447 U.S. 455. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
112. 108 S. Ct. at 2500 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 499-500
(1985) ("we defer to the construction of a state statute given it by the lower federal courts ...
to reflect our belief that district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more
able to interpret the laws of their respective States")). However, Justice Brennan was not so
quick to apply this rule here. He could not find that even one of the lower courts had actually
decided this issue. 108 S. Ct. at 2506 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. 108 S. Ct. at 2501.
114. Id. This does not mean that picketing may never take place in front of a residence.
The Frisby decision apparently allows picketers to march past a residence, but prohibits them
from stopping and focusing on that residence.
115. Id. The Court's deference to the lower courts in interpreting state statutes, see supra
note 112 and accompanying text, quickly disappeared. Both the district court and the Seventh
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Court accepted the appellant's assurance that protestors could still
march into residential neighborhoods, alone or in groups, and could
go door-to-door distributing literature or proselytizing their views."
16
The ordinance so construed provided ample alternative channels of
communication. " 17
The Court then turned to the question of significant governmen-
tal interest and found the ordinance served to guard residential pri-
vacy." t8 Recalling previous decisions protecting the sanctity of the
home," 9 the Court reaffirmed the government's right to shield the
unwilling listener from intrusive speech. 2 °
Finally, the Court considered whether the Brookfield ordinance
was narrowly tailored to eliminate no more than the exact source of
"evil" it was designed to remedy.' 2 ' The Court distinguished focused
Circuit characterized the ordinance as banning all picketing in residential areas. See 108 S. Ct.
at 2505 (White, J., concurring). However, Justice O'Connor said those courts had "fallen into
plain error" because they had not construed the ordinance to avoid constitutional difficulties.
Id. at 2501.
116. 108 S. Ct. at 2501-02. Counsel for the Town of Brookfield told the Court at oral
argument that the town interpreted the ordinance in accord with the narrow reading of the
Court and would enforce that limited view. Id. at 2501.
117. Id. at 2502. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the ordinance did not provide ample
alternative channels. Writing for the majority, Senior Circuit Judge Swygert said:
There is no question that picketing per se is a valuable form of communication. The
more difficult question is whether picketing in a residential neighborhood is an essen-
tial, "uniquely valuable," element of the message Schultz and Braun seek to commu-
nicate. The question we must answer is whether the plaintiffs may effectively deliver
their message elsewhere without, at the same time, changing the character of that
message .... Residential picketing ... does not permit the citizens of Brookfield to
ignore or trivialize the message the picketers wish to communicate. Residential pick-
eting, quite literally, brings the message home .... [T]he fact that the message may
reach and disturb families and children is clearly part of the point of the picketing,
for, to a certain extent, the picketers seek to communicate their concerns about a
perceived assault on the family and on childhood itself.
807 F.2d at 1348. See also, Lee, supra note 26, at 799-810.
118. 108 S. Ct. at 2502 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (protecting the privacy of the home is
"of the highest order in a free and civilized society") and Gregory, 394 U.S. at 125 (Black, J.,
concurring) (the home is "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick")).
119. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (offensive radio broadcasts); Rowan
v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (offensive mailings); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (sound trucks).
120. The state may legislate to protect citizens from intrusions into the home. "[W]e have
repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own
homes and that the government may protect this freedom." 108 S. Ct. at 2502. "There simply
is no right to force speech into the home of the unwilling listener." Id.
121. Id. (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10
(1984)). The Frisby opinion provides the clearest indication yet of what qualifies as "narrowly
tailored": "[a] statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact
source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." Id. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
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picketing-the kind prohibited by the ordinance-from other more
general forms of communication in residential areas.'22 Picketing di-
rected against a single residence must inherently and offensively in-
trude on residential privacy. 2 3 Hence, a complete ban on single-
residence picketing is the most narrowly tailored means of protecting
residential privacy.'24 The Court upheld the Brookfield ordinance,
but limited its holding to uninvited picketing of a single residence.
The holding did not reach the constitutionality of applying the ordi-
nance in other circumstances. 25
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, believed that the cru-
cial question was whether the ordinance at issue forbids only single-
residence picketing.1 26 He was reluctant to accept the Court's con-
struction of the ordinance. 127 Nevertheless, the assurances of the
town's counsel contained sufficient force to avoid applying the "strong
medicine" of the overbreadth doctrine. 128  He acknowledged, how-
ever, that if Brookfield construed the ordinance to forbid all picketing
in residential neighborhoods, the overbreadth doctrine would render
it unconstitutional.1 2
9
122. 108 S. Ct. at 2503. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (march-
ing); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door solicitation); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)
(handbilling).
123. 108 S. Ct. at 2503-04 (contra Schultz, 807 F.2d at 1350 ("[p]icketing is not by its very
nature an activity inherently disruptive of the coherency of an American neighborhood")).
The Court said that picketing focused on a single residence was "fundamentally different" than
other forms of communication in residential areas such as handbilling, solicitation, and march-
ing. Id. at 2503. The Court justified this distinction by saying that the message such picketing
conveys is directed primarily at a particular household, rather than the general public. Id.
Furthermore, the Court found that this type of picketing has a devastating effect on the quiet
enjoyment of the home because of the psychological tensions and pressures it may create. Id.
It is also offensive because the resident is held "captive" in his home with no other way to
avoid the objectionable speech. Id. The number of picketers is irrelevant in determining its
inherent effect, for the Court found that "even a solitary picket can invade residential privacy."
Id.
124. "A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the pro-
scription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil." Id. at 2502-03.
125. Id. at 2504.
126. Id. (White, J., concurring).
127. He questioned the finding on four grounds. First, the more natural reading of the
ordinance would seem to reach more than just single-residence picketing. Id. at 2504-05. Sec-
ond, no authoritative construction of the ordinance by Wisconsin state courts had so limited it.
Id. at 2505. Third, the lower federal courts interpreted the ordinance to broadly apply to all
residential neighborhoods, not just single residences. Id. Finally, even the appellants' brief did
not argue the narrow construction. Id.
128. The overbreadth doctrine "has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a
last resort." Id. at 2505 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S 601, 613 (1973)).
129. Id. at 2505.
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Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, agreed
that the government may prohibit the intrusion of speech into the
home 130 or unduly coercive conduct around the home,' 3 ' "[b]ut so
long as the speech remains outside the home and does not unduly
coerce the occupant, the government's heightened interest in protect-
ing residential privacy is not implicated."' 32 This distinction, he as-
serted, is crucial for it determines whether the ordinance is narrowly
tailored to achieve the government interest. 33 The ordinance sup-
pressed too much speech. 34 He rejected the majority's characteriza-
tion of picketing as inherently and offensively intrusive on privacy,
finding it unsubstantiated. 35
Justice Stevens, also dissenting, 36 noted that picketing is a form
of speech that can become disruptive if too repetitive or hostile in its
presentation. 37 The picketing in this case, he argued, was intended
solely to cause substantial psychological distress and therefore did not
deserve constitutional protection. 38  However, the ordinance would
prohibit some speech protected by the first amendment and was there-
fore "overbroad."' 39  The ordinance also gave the town officials too
much discretion in enforcement. The Town could simply amend the
130. Id. at 2506 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 473 U.S. 726
(1978) (radio waves); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (unwanted mail); Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (excessive noise); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (unwelcome solicitor)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2506-07 (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420
(1971)).
133. Id. at 2507.
134. Justice Brennan argued that it is well within the government's power to enact regula-
tions that neutralize the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects of picketing around the home.
The government could constitutionally regulate the number of picketers, the hours during
which the picketing may take place, or the noise level of such picketing. "But to say that
picketing may be substantially regulated is not to say that it may be prohibited in its entirety."
Id.
135. The Court's reasoning was doubly flawed according to Justice Brennan. First, other
kinds of picketers may not desire to communicate with just the "targeted resident." Even the
appellees stated that they wanted to communicate with both Dr. Victoria and the community.
Second, the assumption that residential picketing is inherently intrusive is unwarranted. The
solitary picket hardly fits the description of the "lurking" stranger, secreting himself outside a
residence, threatening physical harm. Justice Brennan argued that the picketer who truly
desires to harass those inside the home will find that goal thwarted by a narrowly tailored
ordinance substantially limiting the size, time, and volume of the protest. Id. at 2507-08.
136. Id. at 2508 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens said that this ordinance would
make it unlawful for a fifth grader to carry a get well sign in front of the residence of a friend
who was ill.
137. Id. at 2509.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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ordinance to ban conduct that unreasonably interferes with
privacy. ,40
The Frisby ruling did not sidestep the question of the constitu-
tionality of a flat ban on all residential picketing.'41 If such a ban was
permissible, the Court would not have needed to narrowly construe
the ordinance to prohibit only picketing in front of a single resi-
dence.1 42 State and local governments with anti-picketing laws simi-
lar to Brookfield's 143 should enforce such laws only within the narrow
limits set forth in the Frisby decision.
The narrow interpretation of the ordinance was a sincere attempt
to balance the competing interests" in a way that would be accepta-
ble to both sides. However, the Court based its ruling on certain as-
sumptions that could influence future decisions involving speech in
residential neighborhoods. Central to the Court's analysis was the
characterization of picketing directed at a single household as "inher-
ently" and "offensively" intrusive on residential privacy.'45 The
Court held that this kind of picketing was "fundamentally different"
from other more generally directed forms of communication in resi-
dential areas. 46 The Court embraced the portrait of the neighbor-
hood picket drawn by Justice Rehnquist in his Carey dissent.'47
140. Id. at 2510.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
142. So narrowed, the ordinance insures that ample alternative channels of communication
are available to the picketers. See supra note 86. Justice White, concurring, argued that "if the
ordinance were construed to forbid all picketing in residential neighborhoods, the overbreadth
doctrine would render it unconstitutional on its face . 108 S. Ct. at 2505.
143. See supra text accompanying note 5.
144. See Arnolds & Seng, supra note 48, at 468-69.
145. 108 S. Ct. at 2503. See supra discussion at note 123. The Court said that this kind of
"targeted" or "focused" picketing made the homeowner a "captive audience" with no ready
means of avoiding the unwanted speech. 108 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
146. Id. at 2503. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (marching);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (solicitation); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943) (solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (handbilling).
The Court said that these means of communication "may not be completely banned in
residential areas." 108 S. Ct. at 2503. In such cases the "flow of information" was to the
public rather than into households. Id. (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 420 (1971)). In contrast, the Court argued, single-residence picketing is directed at
the household, not the public. It is usually designed to intrude upon the targeted resident in an
especially offensive way. Id.
Picketing can be an effective form of disseminating information because it often attracts
media coverage that leafletting and solicitation will not. In this case, the district court, based
on an uncontradicted affidavit, found that the pro-life picketers wanted to communicate with
both Dr. Victoria and the public. 619 F. Supp. at 795.
147. Justice Rehnquist stated:
Unlike sound trucks, it is not just the distraction of the noise which is in issue-it is
the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home .... Whether noisy or silent,
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It is difficult to imagine how a solitary picket14 walking quietly
back and forth in front of a house is more disruptive than a large
group of protesters marching through the neighborhood.' 49 There is
no doubt that picketing a residence can become disorderly and offen-
sive, but it strains credulity to presume that all such picketing falls
into that category.150
The Court's logic is clear but troublesome: since single-residence
picketing is different from other forms of residential communication
because it is inherently offensive and intrusive, an absolute ban on this
kind of expression is therefore warranted.' Focused picketing in a
residential neighborhood may thus be completely suppressed without
violating the first amendment, even if it relates to a public issue'5 2 and
takes place in a public forum. 153
What justifies this remedy? The right to privacy in the home.
Privacy is certainly a significant interest worthy of governmental pro-
tection. The home must be a place where we can expect others to
respect our privacy. However, a powerful constitutional right to free
expression opposes the privacy interests implicated by focused resi-
dential picketing.
The Town of Brookfield had laws designed to protect residential
privacy and public safety.' 54 The Town Board could have minimized
alone or accompanied by others, whether on the streets or on the sidewalk ... there
are few of us that would feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside our
home.
447 U.S. at 478-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
148. "But the actual size of the group is irrelevant; even a solitary picket can invade resi-
dential privacy." 108 S. Ct. at 2503.
149. The Court held that marching through neighborhoods, alone or in groups, was not
prohibited by the ordinance. Id.
150. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued that focusing speech does not strip it of its
constitutional protection. The site-specific aspect of picketing can actually serve to enhance its
communicative impact on the public. Id. at 2508. He further asserted that the picketers'
ultimate goal-to influence the resident's conduct-did not defeat first amendment protection
either. Id. (citing Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419).
151. All picketing is not prohibited in front of a residence, since the ordinance narrowly
construed still permits marching through a neighborhood or walking a route in front of an
entire block of houses. The Court, however, classifies single-residence picketing as a form of
objectionable speech that can be constitutionally prohibited. "[T]he First Amendment permits
the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot
avoid the objectionable speech." 108 S. Ct. at 2503.
152. Public issue picketing has traditionally received full first amendment protection, re-
gardless of its action component. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 73-86.
154. The General Code of the Town of Brookfield contained several ordinances designed to
preserve peace and order in the community. These included "§§ 9.05 Obstructing Streets and
Sidewalks, 9.06 Loud and Unnecessary Noise Prohibited, 9.08 Loitering Prohibited, 9.09 De-
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the intrusive or coercive aspects of picketing by constitutionally regu-
lating the number of picketers and the hours during which they could
picket.' 55 However, the Court viewed the Town's interest in protect-
ing residential privacy so substantial as to justify prohibiting focused
picketing in a public forum.156
The Court in Frisby arguably extended the protection of residen-
tial privacy beyond that in previous decisions.157 This extension may
signal the Court's willingness to more narrowly restrict or even pro-
hibit other first amendment activities in residential neighborhoods as
well.
Ironically, Frisby may actually heighten the intrusion into family
privacy. The practical effect of the holding may simply be to spread
struction of Property Prohibited, 9.10 Littering Prohibited, 9.943.13 Criminal Trespass to
Land, 9.943.14 Criminal Trespass to Dwelling, and 9.947.01 Disorderly Conduct." Schultz v.
Frisby, 619 F. Supp. at 794-95.
155. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
156. More is at stake than just the physical disruption of the homeowner's peace and quiet
or freedom of movement. The Court argued that targeted picketing creates psychological ten-
sions and pressures as well. 108 S. Ct. at 2503. The resident will undoubtedly be concerned
about his reputation in the neighborhood and the community at large. If the picketing relates
to public issue, and by his own actions he has placed himself on one side of that issue, he may
vigorously oppose the viewpoint of the picketers. Assuming the physical intrusions could be
neutralized by less restrictive means, should these concerns justify prohibiting single-residence
picketing? In his dissent, Justice Brennan suggested that
[T]he discomfort to which the Court must refer is merely that of knowing there is a
person outside who disagrees with someone inside. This may indeed be uncomforta-
ble, but it does not implicate the Town's interest in residential privacy and therefore
does not warrant silencing speech.
Id. at 2508. The Court in Terminiello v. Chicago analyzed the purpose of free speech:
[A] function of free speech ... is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challeng-
ing. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea .... [T]he alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or com-
munity groups.
337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
157. The leafletting and solicitation cases did not result in a complete ban of either activity.
See supra note 146.
The Kovacs decision, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), provides an interesting comparison. In a five-to-
four decision, the Court upheld a municipal ordinance that imposed a criminal penalty upon
persons using sound trucks which emit "loud and raucous noises." Only two members of the
Court believed that a complete prohibition on sound amplification would be constitutional.
The other justices agreed that there must be an accommodation between privacy and speech
interests that would allow reasonable regulation of volume, time and place. Professor Emer-
son observed, "[s]uch a system [of privacy] does not require that all sound amplification be
shut off. It does demand that sound trucks ranging through a residential area in the middle of
the night be silenced." T. EMERSON, supra note 27, at 559.
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out the picketers along the entire block.' If picketing in front of a
single residence "inherently" invades the homeowner's privacy, will
not a similar effect be created by picketing in front of an entire row of
houses? The Court did not address the balance between the privacy
interests of non-targeted neighbors and the privacy of the targeted
resident.
Frisby also brings into focus two additional problems that arise
when determining the constitutionality of restrictions on first amend-
ment activities. First, Frisby illustrates that facially neutral regula-
tions may allow suppression of speech on the basis of content. The
history of the ordinance reveals that the Town Board adopted it in
direct and urgent response to the pro-life demonstrations held in front
of Dr. Victoria's home.'5 9 The Court never reached the question of
whether the ordinance was designed to address the problem of resi-
dential picketing in Brookfield, or was merely a convenient way to get
rid of what some considered a particularly offensive activity. 160
Although motivation is difficult to determine, 6 ' the Court should ex-
amine whether such a regulation is a refuge for those who desire to
suppress viewpoints with which they disagree. Facially neutral re-
strictions which practically discriminate among viewpoints are a seri-
ous first amendment problem that deserve careful scrutiny. 62
The second problem concerns the limits of a court's discretion in
statutory construction. It is a longstanding principle that courts
should interpret statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties. 63 How-
ever, the Court in Frisby had to so narrowly construe the ordinance to
enable it to pass constitutional muster that its reading was contrary to
both lower courts, and not even argued in the appellants' brief.' 6"
158. "General marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in
front of an entire block of houses, is not prohibited by this ordinance." 108 S. Ct. at 2501.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
160. The fact that the town originally made an exception for peaceful labor picketing sug-
gests that this ordinance may not have been aimed at residential picketing in general, but
antiabortion picketing in particular. See supra note 5. Justice Stevens had a "hunch" that the
town would probably not enforce even the present ban against friendly, innocuous, or even
brief unfriendly picketing. 108 S. Ct. at 2510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (inquiry into legislative motivation); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977) (causal relation of motivation in employee dismissal); see also, Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1970 Sup. CT.
REV. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970).
162. See Lee, supra note 26, at 764 n.36.
163. 108 S. Ct. at 2501. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216
(1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
164. 108 S. Ct. at 2505.
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The Court has recognized that its role is not to redraft ordinances. 65
Arguably, the intent of the law when originally written was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad. Perhaps the Court should have given the Town
Board an opportunity to rewrite it. As Justice Black observed in his
concurring opinion in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 66 "[n]arrowly
drawn statutes regulating the conduct of demonstrators and picketers
are not impossible to draft."' 16
7
The Supreme Court encountered in Frisby v. Schultz 168 a classic
confrontation between the privacy rights of citizens in their homes
and the first amendment rights of picketers to free expression. With
picketing regaining popularity as a means for effecting social change,
especially among groups such as pro-life and gay rights activists,
courts will continue to be confronted with the difficult task of dispas-
sionately balancing competing interests. At best, Frisby represents a
very fragile compromise between residential privacy and free speech.
E. Gregory Wallace
165. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (the Court's duty is to
"extrapolate its allowable meaning" since it is not within Court's power to construe and nar-
row state laws). The Eighth Circuit cautiously followed the Frisby example in narrowly con-
struing a provision of the Nebraska mass picketing statute to avoid unconstitutionality.
However, the court refused to rewrite the broad straightforward language of another provision
of the same statute in light of its legislative and enforcement history. United Food and Com-
mercial Workers Local 222 v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1988).
166. 394 U.S. ]I1 (1969).
167. Id. at 124 (Black, J., concurring).
168. 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
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